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I Wittgenstein on Context
François Recanati has rightly complained that although philosophers of language nowadays take context-sensitivity seriously, ‘they keep downplaying it because they tend to reduce it to a specific, limited form, namely indexicality’ (Recanati 2007:1). Philosophers of language in the analytic tradition, says Recanati (ibid), ‘were originally concerned with logic and the formalization of scientific discourse, areas in which the quest for objectivity and explicitness makes context-dependence unwelcome’.  In a similar vein, though writing seventy years earlier, Wittgenstein insisted that the main mistake made by philosophers of his generation was that when they looked at language, ‘what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words’ (LA, p.2)​[1]​. Wittgenstein constantly draws attention to the context (situation, circumstances, surroundings) in which words are used. The notion of a ‘language-game’ characterised as ‘language and the actions into which it is woven’ (PI § 7) was, of course, central to his own work from 1932 onwards.
In what follows, I shall examine how context is a determinant of the content of a speaker’s utterance, and shall not be focusing on utterances containing indexical expressions. My concern will, obviously, be with utterances in situ, but what may not be quite so obvious is why it is particularly profitable to study comic utterances. In brief, what is distinctive about situation comedy is that one form of humour that it features springs from the influence of context (situation). Much situation comedy is crude, barely amusing and completely devoid of philosophical interest. However, there is one element of the best-written sitcoms, the study of which beautifully illustrates a deep problem for cognitive science, throws a flood of light on central themes in Wittgenstein’s late, and late late, philosophy and provides the key to the solution of a number of outstanding problems in the philosophy of language. These are the large claims to be defended in this essay.
The notion of ‘language-game’ makes prominent the concept of language-in-use. It is we language-users, not words themselves, that refer and communicate, and, a token sentence may be used in one context to say something but another token of the very same type may be used in another context to say something quite different. The point is illustrated at PI § 525. Wittgenstein cites the sentence ‘After he had said this, he left her as he did the day before’. He comments ‘Do I understand this sentence? Do I understand it just as I should if I heard it in the course of a narrative? If it were set down in isolation I should say, I don't know what it's about. But all the same I should know how this sentence might perhaps be used; I could myself invent a context for it’. Wittgenstein is not making a trite point about indexicals — that we don't know what the ‘this’ is or who the ‘he’ and ‘her’ are. His point is, rather, that, indexicals aside, we can imagine a variety of surroundings in which that sentence might be uttered, in each of which the sentence would receive a different interpretation. For example, in one context, the speaker is talking about the state of the woman left, in another about the manner of the man's leaving, in another about the mere fact of the leaving's being repeated. There is absolutely no warrant for giving any one of these readings the privileged status of being the sense attaching to the context-free sentence; nor is there some ‘core’ interpretation that all these readings share. Different languages lend themselves differently to such ambiguities. In French, for example, where common noun must always be preceded by article, it would be right, in some situations, to translate ‘J’aime les fleurs’ as ‘I love flowers’, but that translation is not core, because in other contexts (where the French speaker is indicating a certain bunch of flowers) it would be wrong to so translate.
One can immediately see the comic potential of contextual invention. In the middle of a newspaper story about measures being taken to improve the reputation of a rather conservative town, the elders of which are ashamed of its colourful nightlife, we find the sentence

‘The citizens’ committee wants prostitutes to be taught new skills’.

The same sentence used in a different imagined context (say, when the town in question is a liberal one in Denmark) results in a statement that is now not about alternatives to sexual skills, but about additional such skills.​[2]​  The word ‘new’ has multiple senses, and what knowledge of context does, in the above example, is help select the likeliest reading of the word as it occurs in that sentence on any particular occasion of use. The likeliest reading is context-revealed. Another real-life example provides an illustration of the more subtle kind of contextual influence to which Wittgenstein is drawing attention at PI §525, where what the speaker means is context-injected: A friend of mine offered to introduce me to a famous mime, the late Marcel Marceau.  I declined, saying

‘I have done nothing to deserve a meeting with him, and he has done nothing to deserve a meeting with me.’

Someone who does not know me well might assume that the phrase ‘done nothing to deserve’ is being used to say the same thing on both its occurrences. But to anyone, such as my friend, who knows what a modest chap I am, it is obvious that the first occurrence was intended as ‘have done nothing sufficiently good to deserve’, while the second was intended as ‘have done nothing sufficiently bad to deserve’.  In other words, I was saying that I had not earned the right to be introduced to the famous performer, and he had committed no transgression so egregious as to merit the punishment of having the company of a crazy philosopher foisted on him by my friend.  This ambiguity is not, of course, owing to alternative dictionary definitions of ‘deserve’. So this is not a case in which attention to context helps reveal the intended interpretation of an ambiguous word or phrase, but of where a speaker exploits context to inject a certain meaning into his or her sentence. The meaning intended on a given occasion of use can be made explicit by expanding (as I have done above) the compact context-injected sentence.​[3]​
	One further example in the same vein. The background here is that my mother used to pride herself on how clean she kept the house; you could, as the saying goes, eat a meal off the floor. In later years, as her eyesight deteriorated, she sometimes failed to notice when some crumbs or scraps of food fell from the table. I said to her ‘Mum, once you could eat dinner off your floor but now you could eat dinner off your floor’. Without access to the relevant background, the point of this remark, what the speaker meant by it, and its truth-value could not be grasped.
	Wittgenstein took the strong line that there is nothing that a word-combination itself means as distinct from what the speaker means — that sentences have ‘no sense outside the language-game’ (RPP I § 488) — but that does not seem quite right.  We can usually translate English sentences into French, so in a certain sense those sentences have a sense — Recanati (2007: 16) calls it the lekton — that we can understand.​[4]​ But interpreting what a speaker is using a sentence in a certain situation to say is an entirely different matter. We are here making familiar distinctions between translation and interpretation, and between a sentence and a statement that a speaker, on a certain occasion, uses a sentence to make. Consider the following variant of the Wittgenstein example: ‘After President Obama had said “The economy is in a real mess”, he left Hilary Clinton as he did the day before.’ It is only when it is established what statement a particular speaker is using a token of that sentence, on a particular occasion, to make that we get to the position of being able to attempt to discover whether or not that statement is true. Perhaps, for example, earlier comments of the speaker make it clear that, here, he or she meant that the president left peremptorily, or that he left in a state of anger, or that it was Hilary who was in an angry state when the president left, or that she was bemused (just as she had been on the previous day when the president had announced, out of the blue, that the economy was in a real mess). 

II The Elements of Situation Comedy
If we are in doubt as to how to interpret a speaker’s utterance, we can ask him or her to elaborate (Wittgenstein discusses two kinds of elaboration at PI §§530-3) [And see Notebooks 1914-16 pp.68-70 on what the speaker means], but usually we know enough about the speaker and the surrounding circumstances to work out what statement was intended. Notice that, in the case of my utterance about Marcel Marceau, properly interpreting my words required knowing something about me — that I am modest and that I am confident that my hearer knows me to be so. Other contextual knowledge relevant to acquiring the correct interpretation is that Marcel Marceau was a famous performer. So, when we talk about knowledge of context informing interpretation, we are taking ‘context’ to include the attributes of objects, including persons, in the physical and conversational vicinity, and this includes the knowledge and beliefs of those persons including, of course, the knowledge and beliefs of our conversational partners, including what we take them to know or believe about our own knowledge and beliefs.
	In a typical TV situation comedy one becomes increasingly familiar with the characters as the series progresses, but, for the benefit of the casual viewer, each episode needs, to a large extent, to stand alone. The correct interpretation of a remark or an allusion made by a character will frequently depend, as we have seen, on our knowledge of the characteristics of that character and of the things or people about which he or she is speaking For this reason, it is useful to employ comic stereotypes so that the viewer can acquire almost instant familiarity with some facets of the character by virtue of knowledge of the type. We thus have extreme instances — caricatures — of the dizzy (e.g. Phoebe in Friends), the sexually voracious (Nina in Just Shoot Me), the dumb (Woody in Cheers, Latka Gravas in Taxi), the pompous (Frasier in Frasier, Officer McKay in Porridge, Basil in Fawlty Towers), the spoiled mummy’s boy (Raymond in Everybody Loves Raymond) the domineering mother-in-law (Marie in Everybody Loves Raymond), the crazy (Kramer in Seinfeld), the feisty (Carla in Cheers) and so on. Situation comedy employs such character stereotypes and a wide variety of other comic devices, and one could present the elaborate taxonomy of such elements via a tree structure. For present purposes, however, we shall just trace the route that branches to the context-injected ambiguity highlighted at PI §525. 

Roots of Situation Comedy
Character Stereotypes
Slapstick
Running Gag (undiluted by repetition)
Equivocal Plot; improbable plot (Carroll 2005: 167ff)
Undermining of Norms (Carroll 2005: 164)
Practical Jokes
Insulting, Demeaning, Denigrating, Misleading etc.
Verbal Humour

Species of Verbal Humour
Irony












Nonliteral versus literal Meaning
Context-Injected Ambiguity (CIA)

III  Ambiguity and Humour
Single word ambiguity is an impediment to understanding and is, most often, irritating rather than amusing. In a situation comedy, a single-word ambiguity will typically act as a catalyst, because it turns the spotlight on one or some of the comic elements identified above. Cheers features Carla, the short, aggressive Italian barmaid and, in one episode, when a rival bar seemed to be acquiring confidential information about the pub, one of the regulars, suspecting Woody (the simpleton barman) of leaking the secrets, whispers to Carla: ‘Do you think Woody’s a plant?’. She replies, ‘Only from the neck up’. It’s not that there’s anything much funny about ‘plant’ having two meanings, but Carla, in using the word in the sense of ‘vegetable’, insults and demeans Woody and comes up with a nice metaphor for a malfunctioning human brain.​[5]​ 
	Zeugma is a special case of single word ambiguity. The Don Juan recipe for success with women:

‘On a first date, get them either flowers or drunk.’

is satisfying because two readings of the word ‘get’ are elicited, and the hearer’s sudden switch of sense between obtaining  and facilitating occurs only after the last word is heard, producing a ‘garden path’ effect. It is usual for contextual clues to help an audience identify which is the intended sense of an ambiguous word in a sentence, but in zeugma the two (or more) senses are intended to co-habit, just as the duck and rabbit simultaneously inhabit the Jastrow figure (PI, p.194). (Speaking of ducks, explaining the zeugma ‘He broke his duck and the rectory window’ would require supplying the unenlightened reader with highly complex background information on the laws of cricket and on English village landscapes, something for which I obviously do not have the space here.) 
	Amphiboly, wherein a sentence lends itself to at least two different logical parsings, is not a sufficient condition for humour and can engender tiresome confusion when it occurs, for example, in poorly drafted minutes of important meetings. Yet many instances of amphiboly are amusing:

‘There’s Ottmar Hitzfeld, the two year old Bayern Munich manager.’

‘Only two parties can win this election.’​[6]​

‘One morning, I shot an elephant in my pyjamas’ (Groucho Marx in Animal Crackers)

As in the case of single-word ambiguity, it is not the fact that each of these sentences has two possible senses that is amusing; it’s that one of the senses invokes one or more of the aforementioned comic elements. It is improbable that an infant would be managing one of the leading soccer teams in the Bundesliga, a state of affairs that would undermine normal expectations as would an elephant wearing pyjamas. And, regarding the second example, our conception of a distinguished politician is undermined if he presents us with an open invitation to fancy him ignorant of his own country’s electoral rules.
	In various dictionaries there are competing and sometimes nonsensical attempted definitions of metonymy. Lenny (in Porridge) recalling happy times with his girlfriend before his imprisonment, tells his cellmate, Fletcher

‘We were tangoing around the kitchen to the accompaniament of the Northern Dance Band’

to which Fletcher replies ‘It must have been a big kitchen’.  The description ‘the Northern Dance Band’ is here used by Lenny to describe the music of the Northern Dance band. Metonymous appropriation of a term or phrase can be more subtle. Someone who says ‘The pen is mightier than the sword’ is referring to the persuasive power of the written word; the waitress can talk to her colleague about ‘the tuna sandwich’ and be referring to the customer who ordered the tuna sandwich.  A point to note here (it will be picked up again in Section V) is that if someone uses a referring expression X metonymously in a token sentence, then the truth-value of the resulting statement is not likely to be preserved if one substitutes for X a term Y that refers to what X is used non-metonymously to refer to. It is, for example, false (or worse) that the two slices of bread with tuna between them left without paying.  
	Metonymy often displays the nonliteral versus literal interpretation of words. It is not literally true that the musicians of the Northern Dance Band were playing in Lenny’s kitchen. One of the most famous juxtapositions of the nonliteral and the literal is Groucho Marx’s





‘I once had a girlfriend who left me for a midget. I never thought she could stoop so low.’ (Origin unknown, but used in The Two Ronnies)

‘When you said that your friend Binny had Grace Kelly’s nose, I thought you meant that there was some resemblance.’ (Just Shoot Me) 

All these examples feature dead metaphors. With live metaphors there is also, of course, the contrast between the nonliteral and the literal but examples are less likely to be humorous; dead metaphors are so deeply entrenched in quotidian linguistic practice that it is often pleasantly surprising to be reminded that they are in fact metaphorical.

IV Context-Injected Ambiguity (CIA)
Exploitation of context makes possible brevity of expression but, in ordinary conversation, confusion can arise when contextual clues are wrongly read. Although the confusion of contextual clues is rare, this does not mean that context only rarely is a determinant of meaning. Speakers avoid contextual confusion not, typically, by eliminating reliance on context,​[7]​ but by ensuring that context is exploited carefully. If  you are in my room and we have just been discussing the Tractatus, but a copy of the Philosophical Investigations and no other book is prominently sitting on the table between us, it would invite confusion, a context-injected ambiguity, were I to say ‘That book is definitely Wittgenstein’s best’. On the other hand, my meaning would be perfectly clear to you if there were no copy of the Philosophical Investigations on my desk, but there was one in your unopened bag, the content of which I know that you know that I had no means of knowing.​[8]​ Even if I were aware that there might be some books in your bag and that you were aware of my awareness of this possibility, I would not need to resort to a long-winded utterance such as ‘That book — the one that we have just been discussing — is definitely Wittgenstein’s best’, or ‘That book, rather than any that might be in your bag, is definitely Wittgenstein’s best’.
	CIA may occur unwittingly, or it may arise when a speaker intentionally exploits features of the environment; it may occur in real-life, in the dramatic arts or in the description of an utterance woven into a situation, real or imaginary. An example of the latter, credit for which belongs to Jiminy Cricket:

‘The other day, I got knocked down by a bus.  So there I was, lying in the road, and a policeman came up and said “Give me your name, and I'll inform your relatives”.  I said “My relatives already know my name”.’

The policeman’s utterance ‘Give me your name and I’ll inform your relatives’ is elliptical. Taking his words in isolation (i.e. ignoring the fact that they came out of the mouth of a policeman assisting a victim at a traffic accident) one could translate them into another language (so, in one sense, they have meaning), but the translation would not reveal what the policeman, in that situation, meant; his meaning cannot be retrieved unless the context is supplied, and the befuddled victim, not properly alert to that context, interpreted him wrongly. Unlike those cases in which attention to context reveals which of two or more antecedently available candidate readings is the right one, in this case context injects an ingredient of the speaker’s meaning. Assuming that the victim eventually gives the policeman his name, then the policeman’s assertion ‘I’ll inform your relatives’ is true if and only if the policeman subsequently informs those relatives of the accident (which is, of course, quite different from e.g. informing Jiminy’s mother only that her son’s name is ‘Jiminy’). Those are the truth-conditions of the policeman’s statement. In other words, truth-value attaches to the speaker’s meaning, to the content of the token utterance as then used, to the proposition he expressed (not to the words or sentence that he uttered, not to the lekton, not to what his hearer took him to be saying and not to what he may have implicated). 
The expression ‘what is said’ is multiply ambiguous.  It can be used to refer to the words uttered by a speaker; it can be used to refer to what is conveyed, or implicated, by a speaker’s words.  I shall be using the phrase in the sense highlighted above, of ‘what the speaker means’. What is said by the speaker is what the speaker would say if pressed to spell out (expand) what he means. So the narrative cited above might continue: The policeman replied, ‘What I meant, sir, is that if you give me your name, I'll inform your relatives that you have just been involved in a traffic accident’.​[9]​  Elliptical utterances are usually used where the foreshortening of a longer sentence does not threaten ambiguity and misunderstanding. Consider a panhandler accosting a passer-by with the words ‘Spare change’. In so doing, she conveys that she is poor and she may produce the perlocutionary effect of making passers-by feel sorry for her.  But, what proposition does she express?  In uttering the words ‘Spare change’ she is performing the illocutionary act of asking for money,​[10]​ and the illocution or proposition is the content of that act. If a foreigner not familiar with the cryptic expression ‘Spare change’ were to stop and ask the panhandler what she meant, the response would be something like ‘Would you please give me some coins if you have them to spare’.
We shall take what a speaker says (asserts) to be identical with the correct response that would be made by the speaker to a request to explain, as best he or she can, his or her utterance.​[11]​ This notion, though a little imprecise, is not unfamiliar. Requests such as ‘Can you tell me exactly what you are saying?’ and ‘Can you spell that out for me?’ are often made, and met. The spelling out required does not involve disclosure of what the speaker conveyed, or merely suggested; in Kent Bach’s useful neologism (Bach 1994), our concern is with the speaker’s impliciture (not implicature). Speaker meaning does not extend beyond what a speaker can explain in explaining his or her meaning. For a given language shared by a community of speakers, the meaning of a sentence does not extend beyond the explanations of its meaning that members of that community can offer.​[12]​ In the case of sentences containing technical vocabulary, we tend to defer to the explanations of relevant experts.
Following common practice, we have been using ‘utterance’ to refer to the raw sentential string of words uttered by a speaker; ‘assertion’ or ‘statement’ to refer to the content-bearer; ‘what is said’ (or ‘what is asserted’, or ‘the proposition’) to refer to the content. The simplest illustration of the distinction between what speakers utter and what they assert is when a speaker utters ‘Yes’, thereby signalling assent to a proposition that has been put to him or her by a conversational partner. What the speaker is saying (in the sense of this phrase we have described) is what would be his or her correct response to being pressed ‘What are you saying ‘yes’ to?’ where that answer will typically consist of giving expression to that partner’s proposition, possibly with some elaboration or qualification. What must be emphasized, however, is that, in normal circumstances, a speaker’s utterance will be understood, without any need to spell out at tedious length what the speaker meant.
	When examining the locutions that speakers use, one centrally important, but often neglected consideration is that, in any normal conversational situation, a primary determinant of the way in which a speaker frames his or her utterances is what the speaker knows or believes about what the hearer knows or believes — we saw this in several of the examples already given. Trading on this knowledge, speakers can often give very concise expression to what they want to say and the kind of ‘spelling out’ mentioned above is rarely required. In ordinary discourse, many contextual parameters are in play and attention to them contributes to our interpreting a speaker’s words. In order to determine what is expressed by a speaker on a given occasion, it is no use just staring at the words that he or she utters; we must look to his or her intentions in order to determine the proposition expressed. And normally, this involves our attending to the context, because a speaker typically draws upon contextual items (such as objects in the vicinity and knowledge and beliefs the speaker believes to be possessed by the hearer) in order to achieve concise expression. It is both systematic and adventitious features of the conversational situation on which the speaker draws when choosing his or her words.  The latter is termed by Elugardo and Stainton (2004: 443) ‘free pragmatic enrichment’, but ‘opportunistic’ would be a better word to describe how speakers are able to distil what they want to say into a few well-chosen words by drawing upon a great variety of contextual knowledge presumed to be shared with particular audiences. How this is achieved, in real time and with such great ease, is a deep problem for cognitive science. We are, at a rough estimate, one million miles from devising a computer program to mimic this human ability. The Turing test is stringent. In responding to the policeman as he did, the traffic victim Jiminy (let’s assume that he was too shaken to be in any mood for joking) would have failed it. 
The activity of tailoring elliptical utterances to the particularities of particular conversational situations is, of course, fraught with the risk of misfire, for example, when an audience does not have the knowledge a speaker presumes it to have, or when the attention of the audience is drawn to elements of the context other than those on which the speaker intended to draw. The result will frequently be amusing, and a great deal of situation comedy turns precisely on contriving surrounding circumstances in which such confusion can occur.  This deliberately engineered ambiguity occurs, as we have noted, in the absence of any ambiguous words or amphibolous constructions. The following examples are taken from sitcoms that are particularly well written in this respect.
Jack, the wealthy proprietor of the fashion magazine Blush (Just Shoot me) has purchased an expensive picture of an angler sitting fishing by a stream, that he wishes to exhibit in his office as an advertisement to clients of his own self-reliance (and artistic sensibilities). While he is away, several of his colleagues gather round the picture, admire the look of happy contentment on the angler’s face, but then notice that if it’s a fishing rod that the angler is handling, it’s an extremely short one.….  The shocking truth suddenly dawns….. the angler is not fishing, but is masturbating; the picture is pornographic, totally unsuitable for display in a work environment. Jack must be told, but who is going to break the news to him? ‘You do it.’ says Nina to Elliot.  Here is an excellent example of VP ellipsis. Nina’s intention was to nominate Elliot as the person to break the news to Jack that his picture is of a guy jerking off.  Elliot interprets Nina as accusing him of being an habitual masturbator. Different kinds of speech act and different interpretations of ‘do’.  So there is a striking ambiguity. If (as seems correct) this is not a matter of the verb ‘to do’ being ambiguous between all the verbs for which it can replace, then this is a case of context-injected ambiguity. 
Switching channels: Raymond’s wife Deborah answers an early-morning ’phone call from her mother-in-law, and, after putting the receiver down, says to Raymond ‘This day started so well’ (Everybody loves Raymond).  Someone taking this utterance out of context would certainly be unable to tell whether, in referring to the start of the day, Deborah Barone is referring to the crack of dawn, to the time she awoke, or……. to the time of the ’phone call or to the period of the day preceding that time. But Raymond (and we, the viewers), in virtue of knowing facts about his wife’s character, in particular, her penchant for irony and her attitude to her mother-in-law, can narrow down the possibilities to just one — the last. We don’t need Deborah to spell out for us exactly what she means (indeed, if she did, her line would lose much of its punch). What we should note is that, if the situation in the Barone household were entirely different (suppose, for example, that Deborah adored her mother-in-law and was always uplifted by a conversation with her) then her exclaiming ‘This day started so well’ after receiving the call would receive a quite different interpretation.
A final example. In an episode of the series Will and Grace that I am here slightly modifying, Will, a gay man, is explaining to his flatmate Grace his abortive attempt to make a sperm donation.  The plan was for the clinic to use Will’s sperm to impregnate a woman who wanted to have his child.  Grace had previously voiced her objection to this plan: as Will’s long-term best friend, she wanted to have first call on his genes should she be unable to find herself a suitable husband. Clearly, when Will explains his failure to ejaculate by saying to Grace ‘I couldn’t do it because I was picturing you’, he meant that he was imagining a forlorn and dejected Grace, unhappy that her objections had been ignored. But of course, he can also be interpreted as saying that it was picturing Grace’s womanly appearance that, given his homosexual orientation, put him off his stroke. It is only because I have filled you (the reader) in on the background that you are able to reconstruct, from his utterance, what Will was really saying.​[13]​ Obviously, determining whether what the speaker said was true or false requires determining what the speaker said.
My argumentative strategy thus far has been to attempt to clarify what Wittgenstein is claiming when he says that it is not a sentence considered in isolation that has meaning. The bearers of meaning, on his view, are statements embedded both in discourse and in the contexts in which they are used. Sitcoms were used to illustrate this point because in sitcoms, by design, different sets of contextual features give rise to quite different interpretations of a speaker’s utterance, producing humorous confusion. When a speaker spells out or explains what he or she means, then there is little scope for confusion. It is when an utterance is concise, and awareness of context is relied on to supply the missing meaning, that context-injected ambiguity can arise. In the three examples just given, the relevant sentences (the ‘punch lines’) were very concise — ‘You do it’, ‘This day started so well’, ‘I was picturing you, Grace’ — and it is when we see how much spelling out of speakers’ meaning is needed before we are in a position to ascribe truth values that we appreciate the enormous contribution of context-injection.
H.P. Grice maintained that co-operative speakers observe a maxim enjoining conciseness. As we are aware, bores and pedants abound, and one might be forgiven for thinking that Grice’s maxim is neither description nor practical prescription, but mere wishful thinking. However, analysis of ordinary discourse discloses that prolixity, circumlocution, hot air and verbal diarrhoeia notwithstanding, most ordinary utterances are compressed and marvellously so. How, at the level of brain activity, we produce concise utterances by drawing upon shared contextual knowledge (including knowledge of the knowledge and beliefs of our conversational partners) to make ourselves understood in particular communicative situations is, as I have indicated, deeply puzzling. It is highly unlikely that what happens is that we first mentally formulate a long, completely explicit sentence, then shorten it by estimating what communicative work can be allocated to context before, at the final stage, producing a much more concise sentence. Nevertheless, I shall use the term ‘compressed’ to describe the context-injected utterances that could be spelled out at length for the benefit of a stranger less familiar with the particular conversational context. It needs stressing that compression is the norm; compressed utterances are ubiquitous.

V Non-substitutivity of Co-referring Terms
Understanding that, by drawing upon ambient contextual data, we typically use short utterances to say what we want to say holds the key, so I shall argue, to finding a satisfactory explanation of a certain family of philosophical puzzles involving the non-substitutivity of co-referring terms. The underlying form of these puzzles is very simple. Suppose it to be true that Fa, and that ‘b’ and ‘a’ are co-referring. Then you would think that, in all instances, it would be right to infer that Fb is true; Leibniz’ Law demands no less. Yet, in some instances, for some ‘a’/‘b’ pairs, the inference fails. Very puzzling. In the ancient paradox of the veiled man, for example, the relevant pair is ‘the veiled man’/‘your father’; in Kripke’s puzzle about Pierre it is ‘London’/‘Londres’; in one version of the problem as it applies to propositional attitude contexts, it is ‘Superman’/‘Clark Kent’. In each case, to set up the problem, one has to paint an elaborate background (aka: tell a cock-and-bull story) and this provides the first hint that we are in the same territory as the situation comedy with context-injected ambiguity.
	We have already encountered one case of failure of the aforementioned Leibnizian inference. When, on a particular occasion of use, ‘Fa’ is true (the quotation marks here are pointing to the statement made) but the ‘a’ is being used metonymously, one would not expect ‘Fb’ to be true. But, if you asked the waitress to spell out what she meant when she said to the chef ‘The tuna sandwich ran off without paying’, she would say something like ‘The man on Table 12 who was eating a tuna sandwich ran off without paying his bill’. Now, if that man was Joe Schmoe, it is correct to infer that Joe Schmoe ran off without paying his bill. Leibniz’ Law is not threatened. Again, it is true, as it happens, that I am not very smart, but have the body of Michaelangelo’s David. If a sceptic pointed out that, for one thing, my body is not as hard as stone, then I could, more guardedly, claim that my body shape bears a remarkable resemblance to the one represented by Michaelangelo in his statue David.​[14]​ No inference in breach of Leibniz’ Law can be obtained by substitution of a co-referential term for any of the singular terms occurring in the more guarded, decompressed, claim.  The reason is that the speaker’s intended referent is different from what the term ‘the body of David’, considered in isolation, would be thought to refer to. 
Theorists with a craving for generality (BB: 17-19) will want to say that, when a singular term is not being used to refer to its regular referent, it must, instead, always stand for a different unique type of thing — some theorists have suggested that it stands for the sense of a singular term, others for a guise of the regular referent, others for a time-slice. Various other suggestions have appeared in the literature. But the truth is that we are remarkably inventive in how, in the interest of conciseness, we use singular terms — there is a plurality of uses to which referring expressions may be put. I teach Wittgenstein (his philosophy); Wittgenstein occupies three shelves in my office (books on or about him). If you go to one of the Gasthäuser in Lower Austria where Wittgenstein once resided and ask for a Wittgenstein room, they will allocate you one of the rooms that he occupied; if it is a Gasthaus where he did not reside, the landlady will give you a single, austerely furnished and undecorated room of the sort that Wittgenstein favoured.  These are just a few illustrations of the great variety of uses to which a singular term may be put. My use of a singular term may be opportunistic, creative and idiosyncratic, and will be correctly understood by my hearer if I am sufficiently alert to our shared knowledge, to how things look from where she is standing, to her inferential nimbleness, sense of humour etc.. Thus, if several sandwiches are being consumed by customers on various surrounding tables and I am uncertain as to their content, and am reluctant to be so impolite as to point to the offending smoker, I may say to my friend, the waitress, ‘Please tell the fly guy to put out that cigarette’ and this would be shorthand for ‘Please tell the man around whose sandwich the flies are buzzing to put out his cigarette’.
These last few examples illustrate what struck Davidson about that pliability of language that allows meaning to be negotiated impromptu in the course of a conversation. The conception of language Davidson wished to oppose is that ‘in learning a language, a person acquires the ability to operate in accord with a precise and specifiable set of syntactic and semantic rules; verbal communication depends on speaker and hearer sharing such an ability, and it requires no more than this’ (Davidson 1994, p.1).  He denies that we can define successful communication in terms of shared meanings, practices or conventions (Davidson 1986, p.173). Many of the shorthand constructions such as VP-ellipsis, gapping and sluicing that are discussed in linguistics texts​[15]​ are sufficiently rule-bound as to be termed conventional. Others, as Davidson points out, are unconventional, one-off, invented on the fly in response to a particular conversational situation. This is pragmatic ellipsis. All are means of compressing what would be cumbersome, unpleasing utterances into neat, manageable short ones in conformity with the Gricean maxim of manner.
Exploitation of context is an intentional act, and it might be objected that the view advocated here is a form of Humpty-Dumptyism in which communication is rendered impossible because of the absence of any constraint on a speaker’s use of a singular term – it refers to just whatever he or she intends it to refer to.​[16]​ But, on the contrary, I have argued that speakers typically endeavour to so choose their words as to take into account knowledge, beliefs and access to the physical and conversational environment shared with particular audiences in particular surroundings. This is a co-operative endeavour. There will, of course, be cases of misfire, when a speaker’s intentions are not properly grasped, and any serious theory of reference and communication has to identify the conditions for communicative success and for communicative failure — hence the utility of studying the (skilfully engineered) instances of communicative failure that feature in situation comedies.
Understanding how pragmatic ellipsis achieved through the use of singular terms enables us to see why substitution of co-referential expressions often results in a change of truth-value. The publication of Being Jordan: My Autobiography (Price 2004), which raced to the top of the Times best-seller list, is bound to stimulate renewed interest among philosophers and linguists in the problem of the non-substitutivity of co-referring expressions. Jordan is a glamour model, and, as her bust measurement (32JJ) indicates, she is a woman of rather slight build who has artificially enhanced her natural assets so as to become outstanding in her profession. Jordan was baptized ‘Katie Price’, and she describes in the book how she transformed herself from an unremarkable teenager into a household name. Indeed, Chapter 5 bears the title ‘Becoming Jordan’ and the key to this metamorphosis is conveyed in the caption attached to the photograph opposite p.118: ‘Becoming Jordan — one of my first topless shots’. But Jordan is keen to point out that she remains Katie to her close friends. Nobody who follows the plot will have any difficulty understanding the claim that Katie became Jordan but remained Katie to her friends; it would be puerile to protest that if Katie Price is Jordan, she could not become Jordan. But here is a case of failure of substitutivity of co-referentials: it is false that Katie became Katie.
A reviewer of the autobiography wrote ‘The Jordan persona is a carefully styled act. Katie Price is her private personality. Jordan appears once the layers of makeup have set, the skimpy clothes have been stretched and the cameras start clicking’.​[17]​  It is interesting that the book reviewer hints here at a theory defended by a philosopher, David Pitt (2001). The reviewer is suggesting that, in some occurrences, a personal proper name names not the person but a persona of that person (an alter ego in Pitt’s terms), so their view amounts to the claim that, in this context, the singular term ‘Jordan’ is being used metonymously. It is the Jordan persona that appears once the layers of makeup have set, the skimpy clothes have been stretched and the photoshoot begins.
The theory that terms normally used for referring to persons refer, in attitude-ascribing contexts, to personae, might seem to explain the difference in truth-value between
(1)  Dwight finds Jordan alluring
and
(2)	Dwight does not find Katie Price alluring.
(a recurring theme in the book is that Dwight Yorke, an ex-boyfriend, is tantalized by the Jordan persona but is entirely unmoved by the Katie.)  However, the theory is clearly inadequate. First, Dwight believes that Katie Price created Jordan. That is to say, he believes that the persona of Jordan was devised by the real person Katie Price. So clearly, not all names within the scope of ‘believes’ refer to personae. Second, suppose that Max finds neither the Jordan nor the Katie Price personae in the least attractive, but is nevertheless aroused by the particular way of walking that Jordan adopts when on a photoshoot, quite different from Katie’s quite pedestrian style of walking. Then
(3)  Max finds Jordan sexy
 is true, while
(4)  Max finds Katie Price sexy
is, assuming that Max is acquainted with Katie but does not know her to be identical to Jordan, false. We can agree that (3) may be an ellipsis of a statement about Jordan’s gait — in other words, that (3) as here used is a case of metonymy— but only someone suffering a craving for generality would be tempted to infer that personal names, in attitude-ascribing contexts always refer to gaits.
If my wife asks me what I would like for a birthday present, and I reply ‘An inflatable doll that looks like Jordan’, I would think it a poor and tasteless joke if she bought me instead an inflatable doll that looks like Katie Price. This case is particularly problematic for a ‘Direct Reference’ theorist who is committed to holding that my disappointment would be unreasonable — such a theorist has to say that, since Katie is Jordan, the statement ‘I’d like a doll that looks like Jordan’ must have the same truth-value as ‘I’d like a doll that looks like Katie Price’. Clearly, however, these statements differ in truth-value and the Direct Reference theory must be discarded or restricted.​[18]​ The correct thing to say about this case is that, exploiting the knowledge that I share with my wife about Katie/Jordan and her profession, the request that is compressed into ‘I’d like an inflatable doll that looks like Jordan’ is something like ‘I’d like an inflatable doll that looks like Katie Price when she is done up for a photoshoot’. Having now spelled out what was intended by the speaker, we can substitute ‘Jordan’ for ‘Katie Price’ and preserve truth-value. But we should not, in general, expect substitutivity salva veritate in compressed statements.
According to certain legal theorists, notably Ronald Dworkin (1977), the rôle of judges is not to make, but to discover law. Thus, a precedent apparently applicable to an instant case but which, when applied, would deliver a manifestly unfair judgment, is revised. The revised precedent is more complicated than its predecessor since it incorporates distinctions and qualifications that bring it in line with, or close to, the ‘true’ law. From it (we hope) a correct judgment can be derived for the instant case. This should be our model for making inferences from everyday compressed assertions.  If such an assertion together with other plausible premises seems to imply an outlandish conclusion, then we may need to de-compress the assertion in order to retrieve (discover) what the speaker was really saying. This process may be quite tricky, especially in complicated cases such as when the assertion in question is a report of another person’s attitude, where the reporter wants to satisfy the sometimes conflicting  demands to say it as the reportee sees it, and to say it in such a way as to be intelligible to the hearer. 
There is a related, and familiar, ‘discovery’ technique in logic. Suppose the two premises of a certain everyday argument are represented in the propositional calculus as ‘p’ and ‘q’, and the conclusion as ‘r’.  Test that argument for validity by using the procedures of that calculus (e.g., truth-tables) and the verdict would be: invalid. But the original argument may have been a transparently valid syllogism. Resources of the propositional calculus are insufficient for testing the argument’s validity, but the less compressed representation, employing the notation of the quantificational calculus, will give us a correct evaluation. 
	When Dwight utters the words ‘Katie Price became Jordan’ even those with only the meagre knowledge of Katie’s professional and social life that I have transmitted above will understand what he is saying. They, or Dwight himself, could spell out what he said for the benefit of anyone lacking that knowledge. Such a spelling out might mention personae and gaits, and would also include the vital information that ‘Katie Price’ and ‘Jordan’ can be used to refer to the same person and that ‘Jordan’ is also frequently used to refer to a manufactured persona. And, now that we all know what Dwight’s remark was shorthand for, we have a clear explanation of why we could not properly express his belief in the compressed form ‘Katie became Katie’. Vital information would be lost, as it equally would in representing ‘Someone loves someone’ as ‘(x)Lxx’, or in representing a syllogism in the notation of the propositional calculus.

VI  Some Puzzles Solved
The ancient puzzle of the veiled man (ho enkekalummenos) is often presented as a dialogue:

‘Tell me, do you know your own father?’
‘Yes.’
‘Well then, if there’s someone standing here in front of you covered in a veil and I ask you “Do you know this man?” what will you say?’
‘That I don’t know, obviously.’
‘But this veiled person was your father. So if you don’t know this, evidently you’re someone who doesn’t know your own father.’ 

Although sometimes dignified with the title ‘puzzle’ or ‘paradox’, this problem is a bit of a joke. The son is confronted with a trick question: ‘Do you know this man?’ In these circumstances, the son is perfectly entitled to enquire (and would be foolish not to) what the speaker means. The speaker’s compressed question is ambiguous. He could mean ‘Presented with this man, his face covered by a veil, do you know who he is?’ or he could mean ‘Would you know who this man is were the veil now covering his face removed?’.  The son could give answers to both of these decompressed questions (presumably ‘No’ and ‘I don’t know; try me’ respectively) without making himself look stupid. Since the original question was ambiguous (a CIA) it cannot be properly answered as it stands.
	Saul Kripke’s ‘Puzzle about Belief’ (1979) is equally easily dissolved. We observe Pierre, a monolingual and untravelled Frenchman perusing in Paris many pictures of London and delightedly exclaiming ‘Londres est jolie’. After moving to Brixton, a particularly unlovely part of London (I’m enriching Kripke’s story thanks to some local knowledge) and picking up English from the monolingual English, Pierre, who never travels out of Brixton except to equally ugly adjoining parts of town such as Stockwell and Tulse Hill, announces ‘London is not pretty’. Pierre, of course, does not know that London and Londres are one and the same town. Pierre, so we are told, is a rational person and a good logician. He is not prone to assenting to contradictions. Yet, since ‘Londres est jolie’ is a translation of ‘London is pretty’, it seems as if he has done just that and hence believes both that London is pretty and that it is not! What’s more, you are now finding yourself sucked in to assenting to a contradiction: that Pierre believes London to be pretty and that he does not believe it.
Imagine that Pierre had had the good sense to bring his ‘Londres’ pictures with him to England. Let us suppose that he has them spread out on the filthy table in his Brixton bedsit and is wistfully contrasting the scenes they depict with the depressing view from his window. As his gaze wanders back and forth, he is acquiring a mass of perceptual beliefs about London (as it is in the flesh and as it is in his pictures), but we should not want to say that there is anything contradictory about his perception. The contradiction that we have attributed to him occurs only when he opens his big mouth. This is similar to a point made by Jerry Fodor (2003: 56) — sentences, because non-compositional, can be ambiguous, they can express different thoughts; but the thoughts themselves cannot be ambiguous.​[19]​ Those thoughts, expressed out loud, are our decompressed statements with which speakers respond to requests to say what they really mean.
Kripke’s Pierre, in one context, says ‘Londres est jolie’ while stabbing his finger excitedly at some pictures in a magazine; in another context, wandering the shabby streets of Brixton, he says ‘London is not pretty’.  Kripke wants to bully us into answering the question ‘Does Pierre believe, or does he not believe, that London is pretty?’. But both of the cited statements are compressed and ambiguous, so the question is not a fair one.​[20]​ If, on either occasion, one is in doubt about what Pierre means, the safest bet is simply to ask him. Leading questions are fine — ‘Do you, Pierre, mean the whole of the town or just the parts you have been observing?’ If he means the latter, then we can, perhaps, criticize him for careless choice of words, but there is no conflict between his two statements (i.e. between what decompression reveals him to have been asserting either in French or in English). If, however, after having seen some pictures of the town, he was really prepared to assert that London, the whole town, is beautiful, then, however good he might be as a deductive logician, we should have to say that his  inductive logic leaves a lot to be desired. But, either way, the malodour of paradox dissipates.
As our Katie Price / Jordan example illustrated, the non-substitutivity phenomenon does not appear to be restricted to attitude-ascribing, quotational or modal contexts. Superman flies. Superman is identical with Clark Kent. But Clark Kent doesn’t fly. (If that seems correct, then you will probably want to say that, in this setting, the proper names are referring to guises. If Clark takes a shower and has both his supersuit and his grey suit hanging in readiness on the towel rail — since he has not yet checked his work schedule for the remainder of the day — then the statement ‘He flies’, made while pointing at him in the shower, would be true but subject to the qualification (decompression) ‘only some of the time’.) Similarly, we are inclined to say (of course, such inclinations and intuitions need to be examined) that Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Clark Kent, but obviously she did not kiss Superman before she kissed Superman, so the argument to that conclusion is invalid.​[21]​
Formal logic studies the form of arguments, and, if the form of an argument is declared valid (invalid) then every argument of that form is declared valid (invalid). Yet it appears that there are arguments that share the form of the ‘kissing Superman’ one, but that are valid. As Julia Tanney (2008) elegantly explains:

Normally, I would be very sympathetic with the claim that there was a time, t1, at which Lois kissed Superman but not (yet) Clark Kent. I note however that the sense in which Lois (at t1) had not (yet) kissed Clark Kent would be the same as that in which Oedipus, although having slept with Jocasta had not slept with his mother. But Jocasta hanged herself and Oedipus gouged out his eyes because there was no question for them of not accepting substitutivity. 

The only noteworthy change from the first (kissing) argument to the second is that, sexually, we have moved from second base to fourth, but the arguments have a common structure — yet differ in validity-value. And this is traceable to the fact that we think ‘Oedipus slept with Jocasta before he slept with his mother’ is false. An adequate solution to the problem of non-substitutivity must deal with this difficulty, and we shall return to it shortly.
A good way of approaching the non-substitutivity problem as it arises in intensional contexts is to compare it with another puzzle that has to do with propositional attitudes. G.E. Moore pointed out (though he was not the first to do so) that there is a peculiar absurdity in someone saying something like ‘It is not raining, but I believe that it is’. The paradox resides in the fact that both conjuncts could be true — so how come it is absurd to utter the conjunction of two truths??!! Wittgenstein’s response was to point out that to assert that p is to ostensibly express one’s belief that p.​[22]​ So the absurdity in issuing the first-person Moorean utterance is just the absurdity of expressing contradictory beliefs. But — and here’s the connection with the non-substitutivity problem — Wittgenstein did NOT hold that all utterances sharing the Moorean form were quasi-contradictions. He pointed out that in certain surroundings (Umgebungen) a Moorean utterance may make perfectly good sense. ‘Imagine’, says Wittgenstein, ‘an announcer in a railway station who announces that a train is on schedule, but — perhaps groundlessly — is convinced that it won't arrive. He might announce: “Train No. ... will arrive at ... o'clock.  Personally I don't believe it”’(RPP I §486, PI, pp.190-2. (To bring this into line with the version of Moore’s Paradox we are considering, let us have the announcer say ‘Train No. … will not arrive at … o’clock, but I believe that it will’.)  The impishness of the announcement resides in the fact that the announcer begins by speaking (as he is paid to do) as the mouthpiece of the railway company, but suddenly switches to his own voice, distances himself from the official line, adopts his own perspective and succeeds (if the railway company is wrong about the train’s punctuality) in uttering a truth. Without this switch of perspective half way through the sentence, his utterance would be a Moorean absurdity, a quasi-contradiction.
	We fine-tune our words to the multi-dimensional particularities of different conversational situations, mindful of such things as the particular capacities and limitations of a conversational partner and of what we take that partner antecedently to know.  Various pragmatic principles guide the choice of words (Urmson 1968) but, for present purposes, we need mention just two that are pretty much obvious. Normally, when reporting the views of someone, we obey a Perspectival Principle — to so frame the report as to capture the perspective of the person on whom we are reporting (the reportee). The Perspectival Principle, governs a speaker who is reporting to an audience the propositional attitude of a third party (e.g. when I report to you one of the hopes of a mutual friend). The principle enjoins that one should frame one’s report in a way that captures, so far as possible, the way that the person reported or would report his or her own attitude.  One way of doing this is to repeat the actual words while mimicking the voice of the person reported. Thus, although one could say of Thomas the Tank Engine ‘He thought he could’ (make it, under his own steam, up to the top of a long incline), a more vivid way of relaying the heroic episode would be ‘Thomas was like “I think I can, I think I can”’, the words in the inner quotes being pronounced chuff-chuffingly and huff-puffingly.
When reporting beliefs, we typically use those words with which the reportee has expressed (or, we guess, would express) those beliefs.  I report to you: ‘Little Annie believes that Santa Claus comes down chimneys’. On hearing this, you remind me that Santa Claus is the non-existent object named after Nicholas, a convicted German child molester. It is unremarkable that I should not feel obliged to infer ‘Little Annie believes that the non-existent object named after Nicholas, a convicted German child molester, comes down chimneys’. To so report Little Annie’s belief is in clear breach of the principle that one’s report should capture the perspective of the reportee, and would amount to a distortion, a falsification. Little Annie does not possess the concepts of conviction and molestation, and is anyway too young to be a Meinongian.
The second principle, the Overarching Principle is that speakers should, within reasonable limits, choose those words that will render their reports maximally intelligible to their hearers (see our earlier response to the Humpty Dumpty objection).  This principle is in line with the Gricean maxim of manner.  It is a defeasable principle since there will be occasions where it might be worth sacrificing a little bit of intelligibility for some other desideratum such as elegance. Under normal circumstances, operating within ‘reasonable limits’ involves not bothering to spell things out at huge length just to protect oneself against wilful misunderstanding or adolescent logic-chopping. The Overarching Principle sometimes trumps the Perspectival Principle:

Anita, tells me that she thinks her neighbour (whose name she does not know) is grotesquely fat. I wish (in conformity to Grice’s maxim of Manner) to provide a brief report of this belief of Anita’s to my close friend Harry. Harry, I know, knows Edna and knows her name but does not know what I know, namely that it is Edna who is Anita’s neighbour. So I say to Harry ‘Anita believes that Edna is grotesquely fat’ and, in this context (in these surroundings) I have spoken the truth.  Here I set aside the Perspectival Principle and say things not as Anita sees them but in such a way that Harry will understand me (in Gricean terms, I co-operate with my hearer). 

	Let ‘Fa’ be a true statement that a speaker makes in reporting the attitude of a reportee towards a. If that statement is so framed as to capture the perspective of the reportee, and the reportee believes ‘a’ and ‘b’ to be co-referential, and a=b, then ‘Fb’ follows (i.e., the speaker is logically entitled to assert ‘Fb’ in that context); if that statement is so framed as to capture the perspective of the hearer and the hearer believes ‘a’ and ‘b’ to be co-referential, and a=b, then ‘Fb’ follows.  Fallacy arises from perspective-switching.
When we ascribe a belief that Fa to an agent, we say what we think the agent would say if asked about the F-ness of a. So, if someone who knows the Superman story says ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent is a newspaper reporter’, he is telling us how Lois sees (and says) things. But, when he says ‘Superman is Clark Kent’ he is speaking from his own perspective. The mistaken inference to ‘Lois believes that Superman is a newspaper reporter’ is thus due to a perspectival shift and is rather like the fallacy of equivocation.
The statement ‘Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter’ would normally be taken as false, but we can, following Jonathan Berg (1988: 371), imagine a ‘trumping’ situation, similar to the one described above, in which it is used to express a truth:  Two newspaper reporters, sitting in the office, are marvelling at Superman's ability to conceal his identity.  One says to the other, ‘Look, there's Superman in his Clark Kent outfit; he's incredibly convincing!  Everyone thinks he's a reporter — Jimmy Olson, Mr. White — why, even that clever Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter’. Here a true statement is made by the use of that token. In this context, it will be noted, the Overarching Principle trumps the Perspectival Principle because, with Clark/Superman in full view of speaker and hearer, the most salient perspective is their own, so the speaker says it as his hearer sees it.
As in the Wittgenstein ‘train announcement’, what we have here is an example of where a sentence used in one context has a truth-value different from the truth value it would have if used in another context (and here there are no indexicals, no ambiguous expressions and no change of referent from one context to the other). As we noted in our discussion of CIA, what a speaker means will depend on context and, in particular, on what he or she believes about his or her hearer's beliefs — it is in virtue of assuming knowledge shared with the hearer of such contextual features that a speaker is normally able to express him- or herself concisely.
Lois is ignorant of the fact that Clark Kent is Superman, and so we (or most of us, anyway) want to say that someone who tells us ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’ is speaking falsely. But suppose that I am addressing someone whom I know [knows Clark Kent, often sees him donning his supersuit, but does not know that, when suited up, he goes under the name of ‘Superman’, and may not even know that, when so kitted out, he flies]. I could speak the truth (and intend to speak the truth) by telling that person: ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’. Here we have two token utterances of the same type sentence, but differing in truth-value on different occasions of use. The ambiguity is context-injected. But now that I have explained to you the particular circumstances of the latter conversation, you can see why, in those circumstances, the compressed utterance ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’ conveys accurately what the speaker meant. 
This brings us back to Julia Tanney’s observation concerning Oedipus and Jocasta. We, the observers, see the supersuited guy kissing Lois, so, to a significant extent, Lois’ perspective is our own, and we are quite happy to report her as kissing Superman and not Clark. Switch to the example of Oedipus, however, and the change from supersuit to birthday suit makes all the difference. For, in the latter case, when the incestuous deed is being nakedly perpetrated, we and the ghoulish chorus cannot suspend belief in the ghastly truth because we are having our noses rubbed in it, and we thus are constrained to say things as we, not as Oedipus or his mother, see them. 
	 
VII  Meaning Blindness
In the discussion of situation comedy, I offered a number of examples of ambiguity. Some of these were purely verbal, in the sense that someone armed with a good dictionary, grammar book and a comprehensive text on syntactic theory could determine the two or more meanings that the sentences in question have. But some of the ambiguities that we discussed arise neither from lexical ambiguity, nor from amphiboly.  They are created by pragmatic elements, by the surroundings in which a sentence is used on a particular occasion.  In the humorous examples I have given, there is a definite and enjoyable experience of the switch of aspect from one sense to the other. Being enjoyably struck by a humorous ambiguity is the clearest example of the type of experience that people whom Wittgenstein calls ‘meaning blind’ lack. The meaning-blind person is one who cannot say ‘Now I’ve got it’ (RPP I § 206). The meaning-blind person, though aware of the ambiguity (RPP II §571), does not ‘get’ the joke in the sense of experiencing the sudden switch of sense as funny. He or she might admire the skill of the comedy writer in creating such ambiguities, might even be amused to discover that there are such alternative readings and might be satisfied to have identified them, in the same way that a person is satisfied after solving a difficult crossword clue.   But the pleasure of experiencing the meaning-switch would be unavailable to the meaning-blind person. This is a quite specific deficit, because someone who is meaning-blind need not lack a sense of humour (perhaps finding slapstick, improbable plots etc. funny) but would not be able to share normal people’s delight in comic verbal ambiguity.
	We are familiar with aspect-switches, for example, from duck to rabbit in the Jastrow cartoon and from an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick and him sliding backwards down the slope in that same position (PI p.54).​[23]​ What is characteristic of these experiences is their suddenness (PI, p.193) — we exclaim ‘Now I see it as a rabbit!’, ‘Now I see it as an old man sliding backwards!’ Someone who can never see something as something is, in Wittgenstein’s terminology, aspect-blind (PI, p.213). The importance of this concept of aspect-blindness lies, says Wittgenstein, ‘in the connexion between the concepts of ‘seeing an aspect’ and ‘experiencing the meaning of a word’. For we want to ask “What would you be missing if you did not experience the meaning of a word?”’ (PI, p.214).   A little later, he gives this illustration:

Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; ‘tower’ means bank.
I tell him ‘Now go to the tower’ — he understands me and acts accordingly, but he feels the word ‘tower’ to be strange in this use, it has not yet ‘taken on’ the meaning. (PI, p.214)

The meaning-blind person would have no such sense of strangeness. His use of words is, in some sense, robotic or zombie-like — he does not feel that the word ‘tower’ fits towers; the meaning has not grown on him, so he will use any word you tell him to use with no sense of discomfort and, correlatively, will get no joy from wordplay. 
The notions of meaning blindness and the experience of meaning feature heavily in the last period of Wittgenstein’s work (the ‘Third Wittgenstein’, as this is often now called) though there are intimations of them in some of his earlier writings (Goldstein 2004). They are important in an examination of the phenomenology of those elements of situation comedy that we have been discussing, in particular of the sudden perception of ambiguity that jolts us into laughter.​[24]​

References
Åkerman, J. 2009. A plea for pragmatics. Synthese. Available now online at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/3102524723v33535/ (​http:​/​​/​www.springerlink.com​/​content​/​3102524723v33535​/​​)  
Bach, K. 1994. Conversational impliciture. Mind and Language 9:124-62.
Bach, K. 2002. Seemingly semantic intuitions. In Meaning and Truth, eds J. Keim Campbell, M. O’Rourke and D.Shier, 21-33. New York: Seven Bridges Press.
Berg, J.  1988. The Pragmatics of Substitutivity.  Linguistics and Philosophy 11: 355-370.
Blutner R. et al. 2006. Optimal Communication. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications.
Braun, D. and Saul, J. 2002. Simple sentences, substitutions and mistaken evaluations. Philosophical Studies 111: 1-41.
Carroll, N. 2005. Two comic plot structures. Monist 88: 154-83.
Dever, J. 2006. Compositionality. Available at
https://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/papers/compositionalitylong.pdf (​https:​/​​/​webspace.utexas.edu​/​deverj​/​personal​/​papers​/​compositionalitylong.pdf​) 
Davidson, D. 1986. A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, eds R. Grandy and R. Warner, 156-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. 1994. The Social Aspect of Language. In The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, eds B. McGuinness and G. Oliveri, 1-16. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Elugardo, R. and Stainton, R. 2004. Shorthand, syntactic ellipsis, and the pragmatic determinants of what is said. Mind and Language 19: 442-471.
Elugardo, R. and Stainton, R. (eds). 2005. Ellipsis and Nonsentential Speech. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fodor, J. A. 2003. Hume Variations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gauker, C. 2008. Zero tolerance for pragmatics. Synthese 165: 359-371  
Goldstein, L. 1993. The fallacy of the simple question. Analysis 53: 178-181.
Goldstein, L. 2002. A Wittgensteinian (not Gricean) approach to substitutivity puzzles. In Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Re-assessment after 50 years, eds. R. Haller and K. Puhl. Vienna: obv & hpt, pp.99-111.
Goldstein, L. 2004. What does ‘experiencing meaning’ mean? In The Third Wittgenstein, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock. London: Ashgate, pp.107-123.
Grayling, A. C. 1995. Perfect speaker theory. In Studies in Reference and Meaning, eds.K. Turner, J. Hill and P. Kotátko. Prague: Filosofia.
Kripke, S.A. 1979. A puzzle about belief. In Meaning and Use, ed. A.Margalit. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.239-283.
Merchant, J. 2001. The Syntax of Silence: Sluicing Islands and the Theory of Ellipsis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Pelletier, F.J. 2003. Context-dependence and compositionality. Mind and Language 18: 148–161.
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 2004. Lecture Notes. Ling/Phil 596D, University of Arizona. 
http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~hharley/courses/596D/January21_MPPHandout.html (​http:​/​​/​dingo.sbs.arizona.edu​/​~hharley​/​courses​/​596D​/​January21_MPPHandout.html​).
Pitt, D. 2001. Alter egos and their names. The Journal of Philosophy 98: 531-552.
Price, K. 2004. Being Jordan: My Autobiography. London: John Blake Publishing.
Recanati, F. 2007. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saul, J.  1997.  Substitution and simple sentences.  Analysis 57, pp.102-8.
Saul, J. 1993. Still an attitude problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16: 423-35.
Saul, J. 2007. Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. 2000. Context and logical form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23: 391-433.
Szabó, Z.G. 2007. Compositionality. In Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compositionality/#4.2.4 (​http:​/​​/​plato.stanford.edu​/​entries​/​compositionality​/​#4.2.4​) 
Tanney, J. 2008. Blog
https://webct.kent.ac.uk/webct/urw/lc4130001.tp0/cobaltMainFrame.dowebct (​https:​/​​/​webct.kent.ac.uk​/​webct​/​urw​/​lc4130001.tp0​/​cobaltMainFrame.dowebct​))












^1	 Notes I use the following abbreviations for Wittgenstein's works, listed in the order in which they were composed:BB  1958.  The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.LA  1970. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs, ed. C. Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell.PI  1958. Philosophical Investigations (2nd edition), edd. G.E.M. Anscombe, and  R. Rhees. Blackwell, Oxford.RPP 1980. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, edd. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H.von Wright. Oxford: Blackwell.LW   1982. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, edd. G.H. Von Wright, and  H. Nyman. Oxford: Blackwell.
^2	  For further discussion and examples, see Goldstein (1995).
^3	  There are connections that the reader may wish to explore between the injectionism advocated here and other less plausible forms of externalism.
^4	  Consideration of indexicals inclines Recanati to the view that lekta are context-dependent, so different indexical utterances of the same type can express different lekta. And the lekton expressed in the utterance ‘It is raining’ differs from the one expressed in the utterance ‘It is raining here’ (Recanati 2007: 48, 116). Our intertranslatability criterion is, of course, consistent with this characterization.
^5	  Aristotle, at Metaphysics 1006a13-15 uses the same figure to insult anyone who does not embrace the Law of Non-Contradiction.
^6	  This is William Hague, ex Leader of the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom, disparaging the chances of the small third main party, the Liberal Democrats.
^7	  It is doubtful that sentences used in normal conversation can generally be ‘eternalized’ — a point pressed by David Cockburn in discussion.
^8	  This distinction between the physical and the conversational vicinity is what is needed to explain the referent of the demonstrative ‘that’ in Chris Gauker’s example (2008: 363), where what is being spoken about is not the physically nearest ladder but a ladder in a neighbouring house that two of the conversants know to be broken (and know that the other knows it). 
^9	  Here I disagree with Gauker (2008: 367) who denies that the speaker’s intention determines the context for an utterance. He claims ‘that the determinants of the content of a context pertinent to the interpretation of an utterance must be accessible to the speaker’s audience’. In our example of the traffic accidents, one audience (the victim) assigns a different content to the policeman’s utterance than does another audience (an onlooker who overhears the conversation). I say that the onlooker grasps the correct content through correctly identifying the intentions of the policeman (not, of course, by peering into the policeman’s mind but by attending to the same contextual features as the ones that the policeman relies on when framing his utterance). For a different kind of response to Gauker, see Åkerman (2009).
^10	  This seems so obvious as to be hardly worth stating, yet, for any truth however obvious, there will always be some philosopher who denies it.  Jason Stanley (2000) has done so, arguing that it is impossible to perform a genuine speech act with a sub-sentential expression.  For a careful refutation of Stanley’s position, see Elugardo and Stainton (2004). 
^11	  Our concern is therefore with what ordinary speakers mean, not with ‘perfect’ speakers. Compare Anthony Grayling’s ‘perfect speaker theory’ (1995); also Blutner (2006).
^12	  Another way of putting this would be: meaning does not transcend use.
^13	  In the actual script, Will says ‘I couldn’t do it because I was thinking of you, Grace’. Arguably this is a case of single-word ambiguity, with ‘thinking’ connoting ratiocination contrasted with its connoting imagining, fantasizing.
^14	  Note also the compression here achieved by ‘’s’ (apostrophe-s). The statue is not owned by Michaelangelo, but was created by him. And ‘have the body’ is a compression of ‘bears a striking resemblance to the body’ — compare the joke cited earlier about Binny having Grace Kelly’s nose.
^15	  Merchant (2001) is a particularly sophisticated example.
^16	  Crispin Wright put this point to me in conversation.
^17	  Review in South China Morning Post, June 23, 2004.
^18	  This case also creates problems for theorists such as Bach (2002) and Braun and Saul (2002) who think that our semantic intuitions are unreliable, so that we need some coaching if we are to assign truth-values correctly. 
^19	  This is an area of huge current controversy. See Pelletier (2003), Dever (2006) and on Fodor vs. Wittgenstein, Piatello-Palmarini (2004).  For an authoritative overview, see Szabó (2007).
^20	  Answer this question and you have fallen prey to the fallacy of the simple question (Goldstein 1993).
^21	  This type of example was first introduced into the literature by Jenny Saul. See, for example, her (1993, 1997, 2007).
^22	  For a sensitive discussion of Wittgenstein’s position, see Williams (2006: 232-3), and, for an explicit link to the substitutivity puzzle, pp.246-9.
^23	  In PI, this example occurs in an additional remark situated between §139 and §140. It is not quite clear what point Wittgenstein is trying to make with it. He says that a Mars dweller (Marsbewohner) would perhaps describe the picture as being of an old man sliding backwards downhill. The form of life on a planet with a gravitational pull six times greater than that on Earth might not include climbing steep mountains as a popular pastime (especially among the aged) but might involve activities such as backwards skiing. (The Anscombe translation of ‘Marsbewohner’ as ‘Martian’ makes us think of little green men, which was not, I believe, Wittgenstein’s intention.)
^24	  I am grateful to members of the Leverhulme Network on Context and Communication for useful discussion at the Canterbury workshop, September 2008.
